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1.  Introduction 
Emerging markets economies often present profitable opportunities for entry by large 
multinational firms domiciled in developed economies.  Such entry has the potential to bring 
important gains to the emerging economy consumers as well.  Yet at the same time, such foreign 
direct investment (FDI) also poses a risk in that it will typically induce exit by domestic firms.  In 
turn, this can result in not only the loss of profit from such firms but also lead to increased 
concentration and less competition with additional adverse consequences for domestic consumers.  
Theoretical models that investigate this possibility include Ono (1990), Richardson (1998), and 
Bjorvatn (2000).  The question has also motivated empirical work on specific non-tradable markets 
in which FDI has focused, most notably, the banking sector where the introduction of large scale FDI 
has typically been followed by domestic firm exit and substantially increased concentration in Latin 
America an Central Europe.  These include studies by Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria (2001) and 
Gelos and Roldos (2002), and Mkrtchyan (2005).  While these studies generally find that increased 
concentration has been associated with price-cost margins, this is not quite the same as a 
determination of the impact of such entry on domestic welfare.  
This paper builds on the theoretical literature by making use of a recent theoretical model by 
Norman, Pepall, and Richards (2008) [NPR].  Unlike the papers cited above, this analysis does not 
set the domestic market structure arbitrarily but instead works out the equilibrium number of 
domestic firms both before and after the entry of a foreign rival.  Moreover, the initial entrants into 
the domestic market rationally anticipate the later foreign entry and the impact this has on their 
probability of survival.  Domestic firms exit in the face of foreign competition not because of foreign 
predation, as in Bjorvatn (2000), but because the foreign brand is well-known and regarded as 
superior to domestic brands.  In other words, the foreign brand plays the role similar to that of a “fast second” as identified by Geroski and Markides (2004), coming into the domestic market after it has 
been established by domestic firms.  While our analysis potentially applies to many settings, it may 
be particularly appropriate for markets in transitional economies such as the Armenian banking 
sector.  Here, the first step of privatization led to the entry of numerous domestic banks while the 
second step that opened the market to foreign firms witnessed the entry of HSBC and its rapid 
expansion through the domestic market [Dabler-Norris and Floerkemeier (2007), and Mkrtchyan 
(2005)] 
  The model has two periods.  For our purposes, we may think of the first period as that in which 
only domestic firms enter and compete but do so with the knowledge that the market will be opened 
later to entry by a foreign firm with a well-known brand.  The second period then examines the 
equilibrium when the foreign branded firm enters. 
Our analysis then addresses two issues.  First, we consider how the domestic surplus changes 
from the first period, in which there are only domestic firms, to the second period, after foreign 
entry.  From the perspective of empirical analysis, this may be the relevant though experiment as it 
provides an evaluation of the actual experience of foreign entry. 
 Our second exercise then turns to the question as to how the domestic surplus would be 
different over the model’s two periods if in fact foreign entry were precluded to begin with.  As is 
well known, markets with monopolistic competition tend to encourage excessive entry.  When the 
later entry of a foreign, well-known brand is anticipated, however, that initial entry may be 
dampened, i.e., fewer domestic firms may enter the market if they anticipate facing a foreign giant 
after liberalization.  Hence, if an emerging economy were to commit to a policy of never permitting 
foreign entry, domestic entry may again be excessive.  We therefore examine the domestic surplus 
over two periods when such entry is permitted, as in the first case, and when it is not. 
To preview our results briefly, both experiments raise considerable doubt about the wisdom of 
opening the domestic market to FDI.  Typically, any gains to domestic consumers do not outweigh 
the losses to domestic producers.  Equally important, however, we find that a critical factor for 
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mean the ability of domestic firms that exit in the wake of foreign entry to re-enter the market easily 
given the proper price incentive.  We also find that whatever the impact of FDI on domestic welfare, 
liberalization and opening up of the domestic economy is always potentially Pareto-improving from 
a global perspective.  The foreign surplus gain always outweighs any domestic surplus loss.  
2.  The Model:  Foreign Entrants as Fast Seconds in a Monopolistically Competitive Market 
Consider the conventional model of monopolistic competition in the circle spatial setting 
pioneered by Salop (1979).  The circle is normalized to a length of one.   Consumers are located 
continuously around the circle with density D. A consumer at location s most prefers a version of the 
good located at the same spot, and that consumer’s utility declines as the product variety she purchases 
is more distant from location s and also with the price of the good.  To be precise, each consumer s 
obtains a surplus obtained from buying a product with specification x at price p(x) given by: 
() ( ) s x t x p V s x U − − − = ,                         (1) 
Each firm incurs a fixed cost F and a constant marginal cost of c for producing its basic product.  
That is, each firm’s primary costs are described by: 
           ( 2 )   () F cq q C i i + =
Following MacLeod, Norman and Thisse (1988) and Norman and Thisse (1996, 1999), each 
firm produces a basic product of type x identified by its location on the circle at a marginal cost set, 
without loss of generality, to zero.  In addition, as in the flexible manufacturing model of Eaton and 
Schmidt (1994) and also the fast second model of NPR (2008), we further permit each firm to have 
an ability to customize or version its basic product to the needs of an individual consumers at a cost r 
per unit of distance [Shapiro and Varian (1998)].  That is, the marginal cost of producing the version 
xi given the basic product x is:  
() x x r x x MC i i i − = ,         ( 3 )  
  3We assume that r < t, otherwise firms will not find it profitable to version their basic products. As in 
NPR  we also assume that r ≤ 1.   
The ability to version or customize at cost r effectively means that firms can price discriminate as 
shown by MacLeod, Norman, and Thisse (1988). The reason is that once firms control the delivery of 
their product to specific locations, i.e., once firms can customize their product, they cannot commit to 
non-discriminatory (fob) pricing.  If firm i attempts to employ fob pricing it will allow a rival firm j to 
undercut firm i’s delivered price at any location (product-variety) for which firm j’s production plus 
versioning cost is less than firm i’s delivered price.
1  In other words, offering versioned products at 
discriminatory prices becomes a dominant strategy for all firms, which in turn means that the 
differences in the prices paid by different consumers do not fully reflect the differences in the 
customizing costs.  In this respect, the parameter r is a useful indicator of the intensity of price 
competition.  As r falls, each firm’s products substitute more effectively for those of even “distant” 
rivals and prices are driven closer to marginal cost. 
As in NPR, we envision a market divided into two periods each of which has two stages.  In the 
first stage of the first period, n
e domestic entrepreneurs enter a product market in the emerging market 
economy that at present is not open to direct investment by foreign firms.  However, these domestic 
entrepreneurs do recognize that such a firm will enter later with some probability.  In the second stage 
of the first period, the domestic firms compete in prices thereby establishing a domestic market 
equilibrium and an associated surplus for domestic producers and domestic consumers.  In the first 
stage of the second period, we allow for domestic market liberalization and hence the possible late 
entry of a foreign firm.  The distinctive feature of the NPR analysis that we borrow here is that this 
foreign firm comes with a well-known brand or quality advantage, which is endogenous but precisely 
measurable as a premium that domestic consumers are willing to pay for this firm’s product over 
comparable domestic brands.  The final stage of the second period then describes the outcome of the 
                                                 
1 See Lederer and Hurter (1986) and MacLeod, Norman and Thisse (1988) for earlier analysis along these lines. 
Varian and Shapiro (1998) discuss how versioning has been facilitated by e-commerce. 
  4competition in prices in the domestic market given the presence of the foreign “brand-stretcher, e.g., 
HSBC.   
To give the later entrant some brand advantage requires that NPR address the measure of brand 
strength.  For this purpose, they draw on the work of previous researcher including Baldinger and 
Rubinson (1996), Krishnan (1996), and Gomez, McLaughlin, and Wittink (2003), that finds a strong 
link between willingness-to-pay for a specific brand and observed market characteristics such as 
market share or market penetration defined as the fraction of consumers who have ever tried the firm’s 
product and which, itself is closely associated with market share.  A similar approach can be found in 
both Court, Leiter, and Loch (1999) and in Pepall and Richards (2002).  As the market share of each 
pioneer firm is 1/n at the end of period 1 it is natural to use this as a measure of the brand strength of 
the domestic firms in the home market.  However, the “fast second” firm b, that already has an 
established brand in an external market so, the strength of its brand identity in the market in question 
depends on a variety of factors including consumer attitudes and just how “close” the brand stretcher’s  
product is to the good or service sold by the initial n firms.   
We follow NPR in that we capture the variable brand strength of the later, brand-stretching 
entrant by assuming that it is given by the random variable α drawn from a uniform distribution 
ranging from 0 and 1.  The difference is that unlike NPR, we focus on the brand-stretcher as a foreign 
firm.  Accordingly, the market proceeds as follows.  After the first period in which n domestic firms 
settle the market, nature randomly selects a foreign firm with brand strength α to enter the domestic 
market, so that α − 1/n is the relative brand advantage of the foreign firm.  As a result, liberalization 
does not automatically lead to foreign entry as the foreign firm will only enter if α > 1/n. However, 
when such entry does occur, we assume that the maximum value placed on the foreign firm’s product 
is no longer V, but V + α – 1/n, where again α is a random variable reflecting the foreign firm’s brand 
advantage.  Hence, consumer s gets surplus from consuming the foreign brand stretcher’s product with 
specification xb offered at price p(xb): 
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The brand advantage of the foreign firm allows it to “stretch” its brand into the domestic market 
and compete effectively despite charging higher prices than domestic firm.  In particular, if the price 
for any consumer for a particular product of the brand-stretcher is less than α − 1/n higher than price of 
the same product produced by a domestic firm, then the consumer prefers the foreign firm’s product.  
This makes the foreign firm a powerful competitor when it enters the market as it can driver out a 
number of the original domestic firms.  Of course, domestic firms anticipate this when the domestic 
market is first privatized.  These firms work out the expected chance of survival and expected profit in 
the fourth stage of the game after the foreign brand stretcher enters and competes with domestic firms.  
Their initial entry decision then reflects their expected profit over the two periods—the first when 
there is no foreign competitor and the second when there is.
2  
3.  Domestic Market  Equilibrium Before the Foreign Firm Enters (Stage 2) 
From Eaton and Schmitt (1994), the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices if n firms compete with 
versioned products and symmetrically locate on the circle is: 
() n ,..., i s x r min , s x r max , V min s p j
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Hence, the total domestic producer surplus in period 1 is: 
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As in NPR, we assume that V is high enough that all consumers buy the good (the market is 
covered).  Consumer surplus for consumers buying products from one individual firm is: 
                                                 
2NPR have the market growing over time so that the density around the circle is increasing from stage 2 to stage 
4.  Such growth undoes the ceteris paribus assumption needed to isolate the impact of foreign entry on the 
domestic surplus.  Therefore, we have reworked the NPR analysis for the case of zero market growth so that the 
only change between periods 1 and 2 is the entry of the foreign brand stretcher. 
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4.  The Domestic Market After Entry of the Foreign Firm 
NPR show that when the brand stretcher enters, the relative profitability of locating between 
two existing firms, on the one hand, and locating at the same position as an existing firm, on the 
other, may depend on whether the initial number of firms is odd or even, although the difference 
between the two cases is extremely small.  However, they also show that for a reasonable subset of r 
values between 0.5 and 1, , there is a very slight advantage to entry at the same location as a 
preexisting firm is more profitable.
3 We keep this assumption so that when the foreign firm enters, it 
locates at the spot of a pre-existing existing domestic firm.
4 Since it has a product that consumer 
definitely prefer and since it has the same versioning cost as the pre-existing firm, such entry will 
definitely drive that domestic firm from the market so long as the brand-stretcher’s price to any 
consumer s formerly served by the domestic firm does not exceed  n x s r b 1 − + − α .
5   
Of course, the profit of the two nearest neighbors will also be affected.  Here, one of two 
possibilities then exists.  There may again exist a set of prices set by the foreign brand stretcher at 
which the domestic firms are unable to operate profitably and so will exit.  Alternatively, the firms 
may be able to operate profitably but only by lowering their prices to offset the foreign firm’s brand 
                                                 
3The intuition is that by locating at the spot of an initial firm, the brand-stretcher is certain to drive at least one 
competitor out of the market, while this cannot be guaranteed if it locates between two pre-existng ones. 
4We model the foreign firm as entering de novo so as to preserve its brand advantage.  This may not be necessary 
however.  Instead, the foreign firm may enter by buying an existing firm using its ability to drive that firm from 
the market as bargaining power and then investing that product location with its own brand advantage. 
5Like NPR, we consider the entry of only one of a number of potential foreign firms. While modeling the outcome with 
more than one foreign entrant is  of interest it complicates the analysis considerably.  We would need to model the joint 
probability distribution of each of the foreign firms’ brand strengths, as well as the point of entry of each such firm in the 
domestic market.  We believe that the main insights of our model would remain even after allowing for two entrants.  In 
particular, the ability of domestic firms to re-enter and so to police foreign firm pricing will still play a critical role in 
determining the net benefits of FDI for the domestic economy. 
  7advantage.  If the two immediate neighbors do exit, then the next two closest firms on either side of 
the point of foreign entry will now compete directly with the foreign brand stretcher, and the same 
possibilities of exit or remaining to compete with the brand-stretcher arise again.  Note though that 
when the unraveling ends so that there is a surviving domestic firm on either side of the foreign 
brand-stretcher, those domestic firms that lie further away are insulated from the foreign firm’s 
entry.  That is, for surviving domestic firms that are not immediately next to the foreign brand 
stretcher, life in the second period goes on as it did in the first.  The effect of versioning/price 
discrimination is to localize all competition so that for any one firm, the relevant competition comes 
only from its two closest competitors. 
NPR find that the unraveling described above is substantial.  That is, the brand-stretcher’s entry 
leads to considerable exit by the initial entrant firms.  While they work with cases in which the 
market grows either by a little or a lot from period one to period two, we work with the case in which 
there is no growth so that comparisons of the domestic surplus before and after foreign entry are 
purged of any growth effects.  We then determine the equilibrium number of initial entrants n
e such 
that each such firm makes zero expected profit over the two market periods given the probability of 
foreign entry and the domestic firms exit exactly as in NPR.   The analytics behind our results are 
virtually identical to those in NPR and are described in the Appendix.  Despite the changed 
assumption of market growth, we find substantially similar results for initial entry and subsequent 
exit in the wake of entry by a brand-advantaged firm.   
Our market structure results are shown in Table 1. Here, we show the equilibrium number of 
initial domestic entrants n
e and the number of these expected to survive n
s for various values of r and 
firm fixed cost relative to market density F/d0, given the distribution of α, which is taken to be 
uniform between 0 and 1.  As can be seen, the survival rate is typically quite low, typically on the 
order of one in five for any substantial number of initial domestic firms.  This is especially the case 
for low versioning cost values r.  When r is small, the brand-stretching foreign firm can fashion its 
  8product to reach even those consumers who are distant from its point of entry and, with its brand 
advantage, sell at a profit-making price that forces many competitors to leave the market.   
NPR make the assumption that the firms that exit cannot reenter.  These firms face a reentry 
cost that makes such reentry unprofitable.  They recognize that if they were to remain in the market, 
the brand-stretcher would set prices at which they could not sell any output and therefore, they exit 
and thereby leave the brand stretcher free to set higher prices knowing that reentry is not possible. 
We call this the incontestable market outcome.   
In contrast, we also consider the contestable market outcome.  In this scenario, firms that exit 
can reenter freely.  The sunk cost of entry was incurred in the first period and is no longer a factor.  
Here, the possible reentry of such firms acts to constrain the pricing of the brand stretcher even 
though these firms are no longer actually in the market.  For any consumer that it serves, the brand 
stretcher now can charge a price no greater that  n 1 − α above the versioning cost of the nearest 
potential reentrant.   
The difference in the contestable and incontestable cases is illustrated by Figures 1 and 2.  In 
each case, the two dark solid lines indicates the price charged to the consumer with the higher line 
reflecting the prices of the foreign brand-stretcher b.   The lighter lines indicate the cost of supplying 
that version by other firms.  Figure 1 illustrates the contestable case.  Here, the price of the brand-
advantaged foreign firm traces a saw tooth pattern that rises until it reaches the maximum distance 
from the location of a former domestic 1/2n
e firm that has now exited.  From there the foreign firm’s 
price must fall to prevent re-entry by such a firm. The lowest value for the foreign brand stretcher’s 
price occurs at the location of a former domestic firm. At such a point, the domestic firm would re-
enter and profitably serve the consumer at that location if the foreign firm ever sets a price above (α 
- 1/n
e).  From such a point on, the foreign firm can raise its price until it begins to get closer to the 
next location of a domestic firm (that may have exited).  The foreign fast second price then follows 
this rising and falling pattern across the span of the market that it serves. 
  9In contrast, Figure 2 illustrates the incontestable case, which is identical to that modeled by 
NPR.  Here, the foreign firm need not fear any re-entry of now exited domestic firms.  As a result, 
the price it can charge rises linearly as the distance from the nearest surviving domestic firm and 
therefore the cost of its nearest rival in serving such customers grows. 
Note that in either the contestable or incontestable market outcome, an identical number of 
firms exit.  This is because the set of brand-stretcher prices necessary to drive these firms out is the 
same in either case.  The difference is that in the contestable market case, the brand stretcher is 
compelled to maintain these prices while in the incontestable case, the brand stretcher’s ability to set 
these prices is enough to eliminate these competitors a priori and permanently so that they leave and 
the foreign firm can charge higher prices without fear of attracting competition.  Recognizing this, 
the following proposition follows immediately. 
Proposition 1:  If the domestic market is contestable, then in those cases in which a foreign-
brand stretcher actually enters, the total domestic surplus is unchanged from what it was 
prior to such entry.   
Proof:  In the post-entry world there are two kinds of consumers, those who continue to be 
served by domestic firms and those served by the foreign brand-stretcher.  Further, in the 
contestable market case, those who continue to buy a domestic good continue to buy it from 
the same domestic firm from which they bought prior to the foreign entry.  Otherwise, the 
price would rise above versioning cost of an exited firm and invite re-entry.  Hence, the total 
surplus resulting from any domestic sale to a consumer s remains at the same level as it was 
prior to the foreign entry, namely, i x s r V − − , where xi is the location of the nearest 
domestic firm. This surplus will include both a consumer and a producer component. 
Now consider the domestic surplus generated by the foreign brand stretcher’s sales to 
domestic consumers.  The consumer surplus on such sales is  b p n V − − + 1 α , where pb is 
the price set by the foreign firm.  Because versioning individualizes each transaction, the 
  10foreign brand-stretcher will set this price as high as possible.  However, as noted above, 
when the domestic market is contestable this price to any consumer s cannot be larger than 
n x s r i 1 − + − α , where xi is the location of the nearest potential entrant, namely, the 
domestic firm that formerly served consumer s. Hence, the consumer surplus generated by 
the sales of the foreign firm’s product to any domestic consumer s is: 
() . 1 1 i i i x s r V x s r n x s r n V − − = − − + − − − + α α     Thus, the total domestic surplus 
generated by each foreign firm sale is:  i x s r V − − , exactly as it was before foreign entry. 
Of course, the domestic producer surplus from such transactions is zero. 
In short, the foreign brand-stretcher’s entry does not change the total domestic surplus if the 
market is contestable, it does alter the distribution of that surplus.  In particular, on those sales made 
by the foreign firm, all of the domestic surplus now accrues to consumers.  Thus, the actual entry by 
the foreign brand stretcher raises domestic consumer surplus and lowers domestic producer surplus, 
even though it leaves the total domestic surplus unchanged.   Note too, that since the foreign brand 
stretcher earns a profit, its entry into the emerging economy domestic market is unambiguously 
Pareto-improving from a global viewpoint. 
If the domestic market is incontestable, the results will obviously be different.  In this case, we 
have the following proposition.  
Proposition 2: If the domestic market is incontestable, actual entry by a foreign brand-stretcher 
will reduce the total surplus earned by domestic consumers and producers. 
Proof:  The proof follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 1.  For all those sales 
made by surviving domestic producers, the total surplus is the same as it was before foreign 
entry.  However, because the constraint of potential re-entry is no longer present, sales by the 
foreign brand stretcher now occur at a higher price.  Hence, the surplus to domestic consumers 
from such sales is less than it was in the contestable case, while the domestic producer surplus 
remains unchanged.  Since the contestable market enjoyed the same total surplus as the 
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after foreign entry, the fact that the incontestable market yields less domestic surplus than the 
contestable one in the wake of foreign entry implies that that domestic surplus declines 
unambiguously after the foreign brand stretcher enters the domestic market. 
In summary, applying the NPR model to the case of a foreign brand stretcher entering an 
emerging domestic economy market yields one very clear result.  When such entry actually occurs, 
domestic welfare must at best stay the same in total with a loss to producers offset by a gain to 
consumers.  However, if the domestic market is less than perfectly contestable, such entry will 
reduce domestic welfare with a loss to both producers and consumers. 
If foreign entry has the potential to lower domestic welfare, it is natural to ask how large this 
risk might be.  Indeed, this step is critical to understanding the impact of foreign entry on global 
welfare. However, the answer to this question will depend on various parameter values and cannot be 
worked out a priori.  In Table 2, we simulate the post foreign entry market for various values of the 
versioning cost parameter r and the ratio of initial fixed cost F to market size d0.  In each case, we 
use the average value of α consistent with the given number of domestic firms surviving foreign 
entry to determine the changes in domestic consumer surplus ∆CS, domestic producer surplus ∆PS, 
the change in the total domestic surplus ∆TS, and the foreign brand-stretcher’s surplus ∆BPS.  Of 
course, the latter is just the foreign firm’s profit in the newly-entered domestic market.  
Table 2 shows the potential losses that emerge for the domestic economy when the market is 
incontestable so that the foreign firm’s entry leads to losses for both domestic producers and 
consumers.  To be sure, in every such case, the surplus gain of the foreign producer is much larger 
than the domestic economy losses, so that while liberalization and foreign brand-stretching entry are 
welfare-reducing for the domestic economy, they are a potential Pareto improvement for the global 
system.  However, as the domestic losses are typically on the order of one-half the foreign firm’s 
gains, the required proportional transfer from the foreign firm to domestic residents necessary for an 
actual Pareto improvement is considerable. 
  125.  Domestic Welfare in the Absence of Liberalization 
Since domestic welfare must either stay the same or fall in the wake of brand-stretching foreign 
entry, it is natural to ask whether the domestic economy would be better off if it could commit to 
preventing such entry altogether.  However, answering this question is tricky because, as noted 
above, the brand-stretching model used in NPR and also in this paper carries the prediction that 
many of the initial pioneers exit the market when the brand-advantaged firm enters.  Since we 
assume that the initial entrants foresee this outcome and therefore recognize that their first-period 
profits may well not be repeated in the second period this tends to depress the volume of domestic 
firms entering the market in the first place. This is an important outcome because as NPR show, it 
tends to reverse the normally excessive amount of entry associated with basic models of 
monopolistic competition such as Salop (1979).  A prohibition against foreign entry will remove this 
salutary effect and therefore is not unambiguously an improvement for the domestic economy 
Because the NPR model does not generally lead to closed form solutions, we address this issue 
by simulating the model over its two-period horizon under two alternative scenarios.  The first 
scenario assumes that the domestic government in the emerging economy commits to a permanent 
prohibition on foreign entry.  In this case, the number of initial domestic entrants n
p in the first 
period is also the number of domestic firms in the second period as there is no subsequent foreign 
entry to prompt the exit of domestic firms.  In the second scenario, we work out the number of initial 
entrants n
e and survivors n
s for the case discussed above in which the initial domestic entrants 
foresee the later entry of the brand-advantaged foreign firm and therefore anticipate a positive 
probability of exit in the second period.  We then work out the total domestic surplus summed over 
the two model periods, again for various values of r and F/d0.   
Table 3 shows the simulation results when the domestic market is contestable.  Table 4 shows 
the results when the domestic market is incontestable.  Surveying the outcomes displayed in these 
two tables yields a number of clear conclusions.   
  13First, the anticipation of market liberalization and later entry by a brand-advantaged foreign 
firm definitely depresses initial entry by domestic firms.  Typically, n
p exceeds n
p by 15 to 20 
percent, and sometimes by an even greater amount.  Since the brand-stretching entrant induces the 
same number of domestic firms to exit in either case, this result is independent of the extent of 
contestability in the domestic market.   
Second, the depressing effect that anticipated liberalization and the emergence of a brand-
advantaged foreign rival have on initial domestic entry is enough to make such entry deleterious to 
the emerging economy’s total welfare.  That is, the emerging economy would be better off to commit 
to a prohibition of such entry altogether.  In the contestable market case, the difference is small.  The 
decline in domestic welfare that liberalization implies is on the order of one percent or less.  
However, for the incontestable case, an on the order of 10 to 15 percent.   
Finally, in all cases, the total global welfare is always larger under a liberalizing regime that 
permits foreign entry than one that is committed to keeping such entry out indefinitely.  This is 
revealed by the entries in the row in each table marked total global surplus or TS Global.  This row 
shows the global surplus when foreign entry is permitted and so includes the surplus realized by the 
foreign brand-stretching firm.  In contrast, when such entry is not permitted, no foreign profits are 
earned and the total surplus from the market is just the domestic surplus TS Domestic (Prevented).  
In every case across both tables, TS Global exceeds TS Domestic (Prevented).  As we found in our 
earlier analysis, eventual trade liberalization is Pareto-improving for the world if not for the 
emerging economy. 
6.  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The opening of domestic markets to foreign entry is an important issue for transitional and 
emerging market economies.  The anticipation of such liberalization will have implications for 
domestic firm behavior prior to the time of foreign entry.  That entry will, in turn, have additional 
implications for market outcomes after the domestic economy has been opened.   
  14We have addressed this issue using a recent model of entry by a brand-advantaged firm into a 
monopolistically competitive market developed by Norman, Pepall, and Richards (2008). In our 
version of this model, the domestic market is initially populated by relatively small entrepreneurial 
firms each of which correctly anticipates the later liberalization policy that permits the entry of the 
foreign brand-stretching firm.  We then conduct two thought-experiments.  One compares the change 
in total domestic surplus from the period before entry that after entry. This before-and-after 
comparison may be the relevant one for economies that experience actual entry.   The other policy 
experiment compares domestic welfare over the two model periods combined for the case in which 
no foreign entry is ever permitted and the one in which it is permitted after domestic firms have 
established the market.  In each experiment, we differentiate between the case in which the market is 
contestable so that domestic firms that exit in the wake of foreign entry can easily reenter, and the 
case in which the market is incontestable and no such entry is possible. 
Somewhat contrary to our expectations, we find that opening the domestic market to foreign 
entry is unlikely to raise domestic welfare.  However, the extent of contestability in the domestic 
market is crucial.  At best, when the domestic market is contestable the before-and-after comparison 
shows that foreign entry only leaves the domestic surplus unchanged.  When the market is 
incontestable, however, and the foreign brand-advantaged firm is less constrained by domestic 
reentry, the domestic surplus definitely falls.  Similarly, we find that a commitment to prohibit 
foreign entry over both periods yields higher domestic welfare for the emerging economy than the 
one that later opens the economy to foreign entry even though this option does prevent the excessive 
domestic entry that typically characterizes monopolistically competitive markets.  Again, this 
domestic welfare loss is much more severe when the domestic market is incontestable. 
However, while liberalization is often harmful or at least not helpful to the domestic economy 
overall, its effects are not uniform.  In particular, when the domestic economy is contestable, such 
entry effectively results in a transfer of surplus from those domestic firms that exit to there former 
consumers.  More importantly, such liberalization it is welfare enhancing on a global basis.  In either 
  15thought experiment, the profit gain of the foreign brand-stretching entrant always exceeds the 
domestic welfare loss.  So, opening the domestic economy to foreign entry is potentially Pareto-
improving.  That potential can of course be actualized by appropriate taxes or transfers.   
We offer the model as a stylized consideration of liberalization and the opening of emerging 
market economies. Clearly, the model’s formal structure may limit its strict application to the real 
world.  Nevertheless, we believe that the model does have practical insights.  It appears, for example, 
to fit cases like the Armenian one very well.  There, the transition in banking proceeded first by 
privatization, which led to a great influx of new domestic banking firms.  This was later followed by 
an opening of the economy to foreign entry at which point HSBC entered and claimed over twenty-
five percent of the market for deposits [Dabler-Norris and Floerkemeier (2007)] while numerous 
domestic firms exited in the process.  Our results emphasize that the domestic outcome in such cases 
depend critically on the degree of domestic market contestability.  They also demonstrate the 
potential that such entry has to be welfare-enhancing for both domestic and foreign residents if 
accompanied by appropriate taxes and transfers. 
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  188.  Appendix 
Denote a domestic firm to the “left hand side” of the foreign brand stretcher as firm j with basic 
product xj.  Whether there are initially n = 2m or n = 2m + 1 early entrants, j < m and the distance 
between b and j is  () n j n j = .   
Firm j faces three possible outcomes in the wake of b’s entry.  One is that nothing changes.  
This will happen if there is at least one firm in both directions between j and b because price 
discrimination completely localizes all competition.  The second possible outcome is that the 
competition with b is so intense that firm j exits. The final possibility is that all the domestic firms 
between j and b exit so that j is the left-hand survivor that directly competes with b.  For this last 
case, consider a consumer s whose most preferred product specification is ] , [ b j x x s∈ .   The 
maximum price at which firm j can sell successfully to this consumer is: 
() [] b j b j x x s
n







⎛ − − − = α         (A1)     
On the other hand, the minimum price at which firm j can sell to this consumer and earn a non-
negative profit is:  
() [ ] b j j j x x s s x r s p , ∈ − =       ( A 2 )  
Beyond this interval, i.e., for consumers to the left of j, prices are unaffected by b’s entry. 
Denote the domestic firm on which the brand-advantage foreign firm locates as firm 0.  So long 





0 2 , , , n r d r n δ α δ π =       ( A 3 )  
Otherwise firm 0 exits.  Now if  n rj n ≥ − α / 1  then it is clear that the maximum price that firm j 
can charge consumer s is less than the minimum price at which it can earn any profit over the entire 
interval between firm j and firm b.  Hence, in this case, firm j exits and earns nothing while if 






π =   in the 
second period. 
  Finally, suppose  that  ( ) ) , 1 [ / 1 n rj n j r n − ∈ − α .  Then domestic firm j > 1 is the nearest 

















0 2         for 1 < j < m (or m + 1)       (A4) 
When a domestic entrepreneur makes its entry decision in the first stage of period 1, it does not 
know the value of α, the brand strength of the foreign fast second that may enter at a later date.  
Instead, each initial entrepreneur knows that there is a population of established foreign firms each 
with a brand strength α uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].  Nature randomly selects one 
potential fast second from this population and, if α is sufficiently high, foreign FDI occurs.    
To calculate the expected profit of a domestic firm after entry by the “fast second” foreign firm 
b, we consider first the case where the number of domestic firms n is odd, with n = 2m + 1.  Next we 
label the domestic firms such that the firm on which the foreign brand-advantage firm locates is 0, 
the first firm to the left of b’s entry point is 1, the second firm is 2 and so on.  Now consider the 
expected profit of domestic firm j < m in the final period of the game.  For firm 0 this is: 
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π    (A6) 
The first term in (A6) is j’s expected profit given that firm j – 1 remains in the market and the second 
term is expected profit given that firm j – 1 exits in stage 3 but firm j does not. Equation (A6) 
simplifies to: 















π + − + =       ( A 7 )  
On the other hand if the number of domestic firms n is even with n = 2m + 2 equations (A4) 
and (A7) hold for j < m.  Now consider firm m + 1, the firm furthest from the foreign brand-stretcher.  
This firm’s expected profit in this case is: 
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   (A8) 
The actual location of the foreign fast second along the circle is uncertain.  Entry can occur with 
equal probability on any domestic firm. As a result, each domestic firm has a probability 1/n of being 
the unlucky one, earning expected profit in period 2 given by (A5).    If n is odd equal to 2m + 1, a 
domestic entrepreneur i has probability 1/n of being j < m firms to the left of the entry point and 1/n 
of being j firms to the right of the entry point.  In other words, if n is odd, firm i has an overall 
probability 2/n of being the jth-nearest firm to the foreign brand stretcher, with expected profit given 
by (A7).   If n is even = 2m + 2 there is the further 1/n probability that the foreign firm will choose 
the one entry spot that is furthest from the domestic firm, earning expected profit given by (A8).    
The foregoing implies that the expected profit to a domestic firm i in the final stage of the last 
period is: 
() () ()
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   (A9) 
When a foreign firm plays the role of a fast second and offers a product in the domestic market 
bearing its brand, it changes that market’s structure. This evolution can be identified by solving for 
the initial number of domestic firms that enters in the first stage of period 1and the likelihood of their 
survival through the final period of the game.  Given the standard free-entry condition, the 
equilibrium number of domestic firms that enters in stage 1 is the number of entrants n
e for which 
  21expected profit  ( )
2 1
i i E Π + π  is just sufficient to cover the fixed costs of entry F.   From above, the 
expected profit of a domestic firm is: 
() ()
( ) []
() ( ) []
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NPR solve for the value n
e that satisfies the profit conditions  ( ) ( ) 0 , , , ≥ δ Π
e n F r E  and 
( ) ( ) 0 1 , , , < + δ Π
e n F r E . However, even though the equilibrium number of domestic firms, n
e
, is 
homogeneous of degree one in the parameter F/d0, which is the ratio of sunk cost per consumer, 
solving for the equilibrium number of firms still involves three parameters δ, F/d0 and r, which 
makes the equations in (A10) are too complex to permit an analytical solution for n
e.  We therefore 
follow their approach and use numerical simulations to describe the equilibrium number of domestic 
firms n
e.  
However, for any given number of initial domestic firms n
e, the expected number of these that 
survive the foreign firm’s entry of the fast second in the beginning of the game’s second period is 
straightforward.  Consider an early entrant firm j > 1 that is the jth nearest firm to the brand-





j r 1 1
, since only then can the firm sell at a positive price.   NPR then show that for the 
respective cases where n
e = 2m+1, if n
e is odd, and where n
e = 2m +2 is even, the expected number 
of domestic firms that will survive brand-stretching entry n
s is: 
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  22Note that because survival depends only on the firm being able to sell at a positive price it is 
independent of market growth. Note further that given that r < 1, it follows that  4 1
e s n n + ≤ .  For 
example, if the number of domestic firms were n
e = 9, then at most three of these firms could be 
expected to survive in the wake of brand-stretching entry 
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Table 1 
Number of Initial Entrants and Number that Survives in Wake of Later Entry by Brand-
Advantaged Firm 
 
                                                r   












0.001 17  3  19  3  21  4  23  6  25  7 
0.002 12  2  13  3  15  3  16  4  17  5 
0.005 7  1  8  2  9  2  10  3  11  3 
0.010 5  1  6  1  7  2  7  2  8  3 
















Prices After Entry by the Brand-Advantaged Foreign Firm—Incontestable Case 
  24 
Table 3 
Domestic Welfare Change After Entry by Brand-Stretching Foreign Firm—Incontestable Case 
 
r   
0.5 0.625  0.75  0.875  1.00 
∆CS   −0.078  −0.103  −0.115  −0.112  −0.122 
∆PS Domestic   −0.013  −0.015  −0.015  −0.015  −0.015 
∆TS Domestic  −0.091  −0.118  −0.130  −0.127  −0.137 
0.001 
∆PS Foreign  0.183 0.236 0.261 0.254 0.274 
∆CS   −0.077  −0.082  −0.109  −0.111  −0.113 
∆PS Domestic   −0.019  −0.020  −0.021  −0.023  −0.023 
∆TS Domestic  −0.096  −0.102  −0.130  −0.134  −0.136 
0.002 
∆PS Foreign  0.192 0.205 0.262 0.268 0.271 
∆CS   −0.074  −0.068  −0.094  −0.088  −0.112 
∆PS Domestic   −0.034  −0.034  −0.037  −0.035  −0.037 
∆TS Domestic  −0.108  −0.102  −0.131  −0.123  −0.149 
0.005 
∆PS Foreign  0.217 0.208 0.262 0.247 0.300 
∆CS   −0.055  −0.082  −0.070  −0.081  −0.071 
∆PS Domestic   −0.045  −0.048  −0.046  −0.054  −0.047 
∆TS Domestic  −0.100  −0.130  −0.116  −0.135  −0.118 
0.010 
∆PS Foreign  0.205 0.265 0.234 0.272 0.238 
∆CS   −0.014  −0.049  −0.059  −0.037  −0.043 
∆PS Domestic   −0.070  −0.069  −0.082  −0.070  −0.080 
∆TS Domestic  −0.084  −0.118  −0.141  −0.107  −0.123 
0.025 
∆PS Foreign  0.181 0.245 0.293 0.219 0.250 
∆CS   0.032  −0.018  −0.021  −0.025  −0.028 
∆PS Domestic   −0.094  −0.087  −0.104  −0.121  −0.139 
∆TS Domestic  −0.062  −0.105  −0.125  −0.146  −0.167 
F/d 0
0.05 
∆PS Foreign  0.157 0.226 0.271 0.316 0.361 
  25Table 3 
Domestic and Global Welfare When Foreign Entry is Allowed or Prevented—Contestable Case 
r 
   0.5 0.625  0.75  0.875  1 
n
p 22 25  27  29 31 
n
e 17 19  21  23 25 
n
s 3 3  4  6 7 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.0017  −0.0020  −0.0021  −0.0021  −0.0019 
0.001 
TS Global Diff. (A-P)   0.9019 0.1180  0.1305  0.12805  0.1370 
n
e 15 17  19  20 22 
n
s 12 13  15  16 17 
n
p 2 3  3  4 5 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.0021  −0.0028  −0.0026  −0.0028  −0.0033 
0.002 
TS Global Diff. (A-P)   0.0965 0.1025  0.1310  0.1345 0.1355 
n
e 10 11  12  13 14 
n
s 7 8  9  10  11 
n
p 1 2  2  3 3 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.0054  −0.0053  −0.0058  −0.0066  −0.0048 
0.005 
TS Global Diff. (A-P)   0.1100 0.1050  0.1320  0.1248 0.1510 
n
e 7 7  8  9  10 
n
s 5 6  7  7 8 
n
p 1 1  2  2 3 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.0071  −0.0037  −0.0043  −0.0081  −0.0072 
0.010 
TS Global Diff. (A-P)   0.1050 0.1345  0.1190  0.1385 0.1210 
n
e 4 5  5  5 6 
n
s 3 4  4  5 5 
n
p 1 1  1  2 2 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.0105  −0.0079  −0.0094  −0.0022  −0.0108 
0.025 
TS Global Diff. (A-P)   0.0975 0.1270  0.1520  0.1135 0.1300 
n
e 3 3  3  4 4 
n
s 2 3  3  3 3 
n
p 1 1  1  1 1 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.0108 0.0000 0.0000  −0.0182  −0.0208 
F/d 0
0.05 




  26Table 4 
Domestic and Global Welfare When Foreign Entry is Allowed or Prevented—Incontestable Case 
r 
   0.5 0.625  0.75  0.875  1 
n
p 22 25  27  29 31 
n
e 17 19  21  23 25 
n
s 3 3  4  6 7 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.0925  −0.1198  −0.1322  −0.1287  −0.1387 
0.001 
TS Global Diff. (A-P)   0.1825 0.2360  0.2600  0.2535 0.2740 
n
e 15 17  19  20 22 
n
s 12 13  15  16 17 
n
p 2 3  3  4 5 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.0976  −0.1045  −0.1326  −0.1361  −0.1383 
0.002 
TS Global Diff. (A-P)   0.1920 0.2045  0.2610  0.2175 0.2705 
n
e 10 11  12  13 14 
n
s 7 8  9  10  11 
n
p 1 2  2  3 3 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.1125  −0.1079  −0.1354  −0.1381  −0.1536 
0.005 
TS Global Diff. (A-P)   0.2170 0.2075  0.2615  0.2650 0.2995 
n
e 7 7  8  9  10 
n
s 5 6  7  7 8 
n
p 1 1  2  2 3 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.1071  −0.1339  −0.1191  −0.1420  −0.1144 
0.010 
TS Global Diff. (A-P)   0.2050 0.2650  0.2516  0.2720 0.2380 
n
e 4 5  5  5 6 
n
s 3 4  4  5 5 
n
p 1 1  1  2 2 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.0938  −0.1250  −0.1500  −0.1072  −0.1308 
0.025 
TS Global Diff. (A-P)   0.1805 0.2445  0.2930  0.2285 0.2650 
n
e 3 3  3  4 4 
n
s 2 3  3  3 3 
n
p 1 1  1  1 1 
TS Domestic Diff. (A-P)  −0.0827  −0.1041  −0.1250  −0.1640  −0.1875 
F/d 0
0.05 
TS Global Diff. (A-P)   0.1565 0.2260  0.2710  0.3160 0.3610 
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